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The hundreds of legal claims brought by foreign investors against states under bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) have prompted growing public backlash. Yet governments are 
responding to this backlash differently. Some countries heavily targeted by investor 
claims have terminated BITs while others have sought only moderate reforms to key 
provisions. Despite the rich literature on BITs, we know little about the growing 
dissonance in government approaches toward investor rights: Why do some countries 
terminate BITs while others seek to reform them? This article explores the strategies 
governments used to defend public and political interests during investor-state disputes in 
Argentina and Ecuador. Governments in both cases adopted policies they knew were 
likely to infringe on investor rights and employed strategies to mitigate the costs of 
investor claims with some success. Variation in government approaches, namely 
Ecuador’s decision to terminate BITs and Argentina’s decision to maintain them, stems 
from ideological differences and state-society relations. Ideological differences, which 
reflect their social bases, caused policymakers to weigh the costs and benefits of BITs 
relative to domestic interests differently. This demonstrates that governments are not 
passive recipients of international rules, but instead will knowingly break with such rules 


















Hundreds of legal claims have been brought against governments by foreign 
investors under bilateral investment treaties (BITs) since the 1990s, resulting in multi-
million dollar fines imposed against governments found to have infringed on their 
agreements. Concerns that BITs bind government hands and lock governments into 
investor-friendly regulatory frameworks pervade the rich BIT literature (Chang 2004; 
Cho and Dubash 2005; Blackwood and McBride 2006; Gallagher 2008; Manger 2008; 
Van Harten 2008; Miles 2010; Yazbek 2010; Cutler 2013). However, while the mounting 
number of investor claims demonstrates the potential costs of BITs, it also suggests that 
BITs do not effectively constrain government action. Such a high number of claims 
would not exist if governments always adhered to BIT obligations. Moreover, resistance 
to investor claims is growing. Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, India and South Africa 
terminated BITs after high profile disputes. Others countries, such as Argentina, Canada 
and European Union members are modifying key provisions in hopes of better protecting 
regulatory space in new BITs and mega-regional trade agreements. To the United Nations 
Conference of Trade and Development, these reform efforts signal a new era of 
‘reorientation’ in the articulation of international investment law (UNCTAD 2015: 123).  
 Scholars have sought to explain why governments sign on to BITs given their 
potential costs (Guzman 1998; Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2006; Simmons, Dobin and 
Garrett 2006; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2011; Allee and Peinhardt 2014; Simmons 
2014). Economic competition, the coercive influence of capital-exporting states, and 
interest group pressure are among the factors often cited as driving BIT formulation. Yet, 
the rate of new BITs signed per year is declining. Scholars attribute this trend to 
governments’ increased awareness of the potential costs of BITs (Jandyhala Henisz and 
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Mansfield 2011; Poulsen and Aisbett 2013). However, this does not adequately explain 
the dissonance in government attitudes: why do some governments heavily targeted by 
investor claims terminate BITs while others do not? Divergent responses to investor 
claims suggests that governments perceive the costs of BITs differently. While efforts to 
reform BITs capture growing attention (Spears 2010; Mysore and Vora 2016; Hildelang 
and Krajewski 2016), we know little about how mechanisms interact to inform different 
responses.  
 This article contributes to filling these gaps by examining how political ideology 
and state-society relations shape government approaches towards BITs. Governments are 
not passive recipients of international rules, but instead will knowingly break with such 
rules where domestic interests are perceived to necessitate it. Interest group pressure, 
domestic economic performance, global power politics and investor claims influence 
government attitudes towards investor rights. Yet the importance policymakers assign to 
these factors relative to public and political interests will vary according to policymakers’ 
normative beliefs and state-society relations. Governments more tolerant of the principles 
that underpin BITs will be more likely to accept their potential costs over time, 
particularly in the absence of civil society contestation. Governments who contest such 
principles will be less tolerant of such costs and more susceptible to calls for policies that 
challenge investor treaty rights. Decisions to follow or infringe, and terminate or 
formulate BITs must be understood as a product of policymaker perceptions, which are in 
part subjective, as opposed to purely rationalist calculations. Current efforts to reform 
BITs reflect a weakening of support for the international standards that informed their 
 4 
proliferation in the 1990s. These reform efforts maybe expanded or reversed by further 
changes in the normative bases upon which BITs rely.  
I illustrate this argument with a comparative case study analysis of Argentina and 
Ecuador’s approach to BITs after investor claims. These case studies are informed by an 
extensive analysis of legal transcripts and interviews with public officials, international 
lawyers and civil society representatives. Most studies of BIT formulation utilize cross-
national analyses aimed at exposing the correlation between potential causal mechanisms 
and trends in BIT signings. Comparing case studies enables me to build on these insights 
by exploring more deeply how these mechanisms (interest group pressure, domestic 
economic performance, global power politics and investor claims) interact with officials’ 
normative beliefs to shape orientations towards BITs over time.  
Argentina and Ecuador are among the most frequently litigated countries under 
BITs. I focus on Argentina’s disputes with water companies and Ecuador’s disputes with 
oil companies, which represent the largest grouping by sector of investor claims in each 
country.i These claims drew strong public opposition and played out at a time when their 
domestic economies were recovering from drastic economic downturns. Yet the 
governments in power at the height of the disputes responded to investor claims 
differently. In Ecuador, the Correa administration (2006 to 2016) terminated BITs and 
withdrew from the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), the world’s most prominent investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) body. In 
Argentina, the Kirchner governments (2003 – 2015) used political pressures to incent 
foreign investors to drop claims under the parameters of existing rules. Their responses to 
investor claims may appear unrepresentative as some governments continue to advance 
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stringent BITs. Yet their approaches reflect a growing trend of government and civil 
society resistance to investor claims. Moreover, although both the Correa and Kirchner 
governments subscribed to a left-leaning political ideology, they demonstrated important 
ideological differences, which had a significant impact on their approaches. As such, the 
cases offer the opportunity to examine how changes in domestic conditions, and in 
particular government ideology, influence BIT compliance.  
Despite being affiliated with the ‘pink tide’ of left-leaning governments that 
swept to power in Latin America during the early 2000s (Escobar 2010; Levitsky and 
Roberts 2011), the Kirchner and Correa administrations differ ideologically. The 
Kirchner administrations contested neoliberalism discursively, but were tolerant of 
neoliberal principles in practice (Wylde 2011 and 2016). Officials objected to ISDS, but 
perceived of BITs as necessary and legitimate tools to attract and retain foreign 
investment despite investor claims, civil society opposition and strong economic recovery 
following the 2001 crisis. The Correa administration subscribed to a more ardent leftist 
political ideology, promising to recapture state sovereignty and install ‘21st Century 
Socialism’ (Conaghan 2008). Political officials perceived of BITs as an illegitimate 
constraint on policy autonomy. As such, officials were more receptive to demands for a 
curtailment of investor rights and more willing to take on the costs of terminating BITs in 
terms of capital flight and relations with home-states. Variation in ideology, therefore, 
played an important role in shaping the countries’ divergent responses.  
This study enhances understandings of BIT formulation in three ways. First, it 
helps account for recent trends by better explaining why governments heavily targeted by 
investor claims react differently. Public opposition to investor rights is growing in 
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developed and developing countries, however this study demonstrates that political 
ideology may foster a conducive environment or close opportunities for such dissent. 
Second, it demonstrates that BITs do not constrain government action consistently across 
contexts. In both cases, governments introduced policies they knew were likely to prompt 
investor claims. BITs raised the cost of pursuing these policies, but governments adopted 
defense strategies that mitigated these costs to some degree. They also sought new 
intraregional alliances and strengthened ties with alternative economic partners to 
counteract the effects of sanctions imposed by investors’ home-states. This suggests that 
externally imposed constraints may induce governments to experiment with policies in 
ways they otherwise may not have. Lastly, it helps us better understand governments’ 
bargaining power vis-à-vis foreign investors under BITs. In both cases, bargaining power 
was strengthened by the popularity of elected officials and strong economic recovery, 
which contributed to the success of defense strategies.  
In the next section, I discuss existing literature on BIT formulation and 
problematize the portrayal of governments as purely rationalist, utility-maximizing 
agents. I then propose an alternative theoretical framework that recognizes the socially 
constructed and contingent nature of investor rights and the role normative beliefs play in 
shaping perceptions of BIT obligations. In subsequent sections I discuss the cases of 
Ecuador and Argentina and contrast each country’s experience to assess how political 
ideology shapes governments’ unique orientations towards BITs.  
 
Ideology and Investment Rules    
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International standards on the treatment of foreign investment were contested and 
unstable prior to the 1980s. Western European countries and the United States sought to 
protect the property and profit-making of their nationals abroad by enshrining principles 
on investment protection in customary international law. Most notably, this included the 
right to intervene where foreign assets were nationalized by local governments. However, 
newly independent countries in Latin America, and then Africa and Asia, asserted their 
right to decide freely over domestic economic policy, including the right to expropriate 
foreign-owned assets (Subedi 2012: 8; Ghouri 2011: 191; Miles 2013). The standards 
championed by capital-exporting countries were therefore curtailed and subject to 
disagreement when put into practice. Western European countries began to advance what 
became the world’s first BITs with former colonies in the 1950s and 1960s to secure 
agreement on a limited number of investment protections. At the same time, the World 
Bank sought to define a role for itself in international investment law with the 
establishment of ICSID. ICSID was meant to provide a neutral and apolitical venue 
where foreign investors could bring claims unilaterally against their hosts and avoid the 
trouble associated with convincing their home governments to take up a claim on their 
behalf (Subedi 2012: 95). The United States, however, continued to insist that foreign 
investment was protected under customary international law and pursued only a handful 
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties that addressed investment in broad 
strokes. It was not until the 1980s that the United States adopted its first BIT program 
(Ghouri 2011; Pauwelyn 2005).  
The steady internationalization of domestic economies in the 1970s and 1980s 
leant greater impetus to the push for stringent investment protections. The rise of 
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neoliberalism as the dominant policy paradigm in the global political economy and 
efforts to restructure developing country economies according to neoliberal prescriptions 
created a receptive environment for stronger investment rules. Lauded as an efficient 
means to attract foreign investment at a time when competition for foreign capital rose 
steadily, BITs became a pillar of development strategies in developing countries. 
Meanwhile, the United States became a powerful voice in the championing of 
multilateral investment rules. Yet, efforts to negotiate a multilateral agreement on 
investment twice failed, halted by influential developing countries that feared the 
standards insisted upon by capital-exporting countries would reduce their ability to 
promote substantive development (Pauwelyn 2005). As a result, capital-exporting 
countries ramped up efforts to secure BITs. While only 385 agreements were in force in 
1990s, currently there exists more than 3300 (Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2011: 3; 
UNCTAD 2017a: 111). 
Although no two are the same, most BITs signed in this period contained more 
stringent standards on the entry and exit, treatment and expropriation of foreign 
investment than previous agreements. More controversial are the ISDS provisions 
commonly included in this generation of agreements. Earlier BITs and customary 
international law placed upon states the burden of defending their nationals’ foreign 
assets through state-state dispute settlement; a cumbersome process that left many 
aggrieved foreign investors unsatisfied (Vandevelde 2005: 160). ISDS provisions give 
foreign investors the capacity to sue their hosts through ICSID or any of the regional 
arbitration centers recognized under the United Nations Centre for Trade and Investment 
Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules. ISDS provisions were sold to governments as a 
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technical and efficient means to avoid the political fallout that resulted from state-state 
dispute settlement (Pauwelyn 2005: 26 – 28). In the last two decades, governments have 
become increasingly aware of the costs of consenting to such provisions. While only 25 
disputes were brought to ICSID until the 1990s, more than 767 known claims have been 
brought against governments by the end of 2016, most of which to ICSID (Pauwelyn 
2005: 30; UNCTAD 2017a: 115).   
Scholars have sought to explain why governments rushed to the more stringent 
BITs in the 1990s (Guzman 1998; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2011; Allee and Peinhardt 
2014; Simmons 2014; Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2006; Simmons, Dobin and Garrett 
2006). The desire to signal credible commitments to investor-friendly policies, the 
coercive pressures of capital-exporting countries, domestic interest group pressure, 
economic competition, and declining economic performance have all been cited as 
driving BIT formulation. Yet the realist and rationalist assumptions that dominate most 
studies ignore the constructed qualities of investment rules. A growing number of BITs 
have been signed between capital poor, developing countries since the mid-1990s that 
reflect the standards championed by developed countries. This suggests that some 
developing countries have internalized these standards and integrated them into their own 
BIT programs. Indeed, as Jandhyala, Henisz and Mansfield (2011) observe, this trend 
reflects a growing tendency for governments to view BITs as an appropriate act, 
irrespective of pressure from a potential foreign investor or its government. This suggests 
the consolidation of a global norm regarding the treatment of foreign investment by host-
countries.  
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However, while the number of south-south BITs has grown, the overall rate of 
new BITs signed per year has declined since 2002 (UNCTAD 2017a: 111). Jandyhala, 
Henisz and Mansfield (2011) attribute this decline to investor claims, which increased 
awareness of the potential costs of BITs. The normative influence of BITs has waned and 
governments are now returning to a more rational cost / benefit analysis in their approach 
to BITs. Similarly, Poulsen and Aisbet (2013: 274) argue that BIT claims “led to spatially 
and temporally dispersed arrival of important information about the potential costs of 
BITs”, causing policymakers to re-evaluate and slow down their BIT participation. This 
assumes that governments were not fully aware of the risks of investor claims and, as 
rational actors, limit their exposure to such costs after being directly targeted by a claim. 
Governments that have not experienced claims are likely to continue signing BITs 
because, as narcissistic actors, governments focus less on what happens to their 
neighbours (Poulsen and Aisbet 2013). This does not explain why governments heavily 
targeted by investor claims react to them differently. Indeed, the dissonance in 
government approaches suggests that governments perceive the costs versus benefits of 
BITs differently. Moreover, while existing studies identify mechanisms that drive BIT 
formulation, they do not adequately specify the conditions under which one or more 
mechanism matters over time and how these mechanisms interact to shape government 
orientations.  Better explaining why some governments contest BITs while others sign on 
to them requires exploring how these mechanisms fluctuate to shape policymaker 
perceptions of IIAs over time.  
 Perceptions are shaped by two kinds of ideas: core / normative believes and the 
more malleable framing processes (or causal beliefs) that inform actors’ understandings 
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of the world around them. Both kinds of ideas evolve over time, but causal beliefs evolve 
most rapidly depending on actor’s experiences and interactions (Schmidt 2008; Béland 
2009). Poulsen and Aisbett (2013) illustrate the importance of changes in policymakers’ 
causal ideas regarding the perceived costs versus benefits attributable to BITs. Yet, they 
ignore the role of normative beliefs play in shaping how governments perceive these 
costs in the policymaking process. Normative ideas shape policymaking in various ways, 
for instance, by helping to define what issues policymakers see as relevant, how they 
assign importance to competing issues, the goals they set out for themselves, and how 
they choose between the range of instruments that can be used to attain them (Béland 
2009: 704 – 705). Ideological differences, therefore, may cause variation in policymaker 
orientations towards BITs in several ways, for instance, by altering the importance 
policymakers assign to BIT obligations relative to civil society demands, the extent to 
which they believe BIT are a necessary and legitimate tool to attract foreign investment, 
and how they balance investor rights with the pursuit of other policy goals. Indeed, 
international legal scholars have long recognized the importance of normative beliefs in 
shaping government behaviour towards international law (Franck 1995). In the next 
sections, I examine how governments in Ecuador and Argentina responded to investor 
claims and how their approach to BITs varied over time according to shifts in 
governments’ political ideology, state-society relations and domestic economic 
performance.  
 
Argentina and Selective Adherence to International Investment Law 
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 Argentina has faced the greatest number of investor claims out of any country in 
the world. Most claims were prompted by emergency measures the government adopted 
to placate the symptoms of the 2001 economic crisis, which altered the neoliberal 
regulatory framework fashioned by Carlos Menem in the 1990s. These claims 
demonstrate the high costs of infringing on BITs. However, as this section demonstrates, 
civil society demands for affordable access to basic services, strong domestic economic 
performance, the declining influence of business elites and the government’s political 
ideology mediated the influence BITs had on government action and informed 
government responses to investor claims thereafter. Yet, despite calls from left-leaning 
legislators and civil society, the Kirchners refused to terminate BITs. While state officials 
objected to ICSID, they believed BITs were a legitimate means to attract investment 
despite their potential costs. Thus, normative beliefs limited how far the government was 
willing to go to challenge investor rights.    
Following the hyperinflationary crisis of the 1980s, the government of Carlos 
Menem (elected in 1989) adopted sweeping neoliberal reforms aimed at privatizing state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), reducing state-related employment, welfare system reform 
and economic liberalization (Villalón 2006; Di Tella 1990). Menem’s goal was to draw 
foreign investment into telecommunications, transportation, power and water and 
sanitation sectors to reduce state spending and improve deteriorated infrastructure. 
Crucial to the privatization project was the 1991 Currency Convertibility Plan, which 
pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar to overcome inflation and give confidence to 
foreign investors (Haselip and Potter 2010: 1168). 55 BITs were brought into force to 
signal the country’s commitment to liberal economic policy. Provincial governments 
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were also pushed to privatize services however only 14 of 23 provinces and the 
autonomous city of Buenos Aires privatized electricity distribution systems while 13 
privatized urban water and sanitation systems (Post and Murillo 2013: 117-118). 
Nevertheless, the sale of state assets generated capital receipts amounting to US$ 18 
billion by 1993 (Rodriguez-Boetsch 2005: 302). The first years of neoliberal adjustment 
(1990-1994) were therefore deemed a success as the annual average growth rate reached 
7.7 percent (Haselip 2005: 78; Villalón 2006: 140).  
 Pressure from international financial institutions and a desire to establish his 
neoliberal credentials motivated Menem to rush the privatization process. Contracts with 
foreign investors were designed to attract rapid investment with generous terms that 
limited government regulatory powers (Stanley 2006). Little effort was given to 
maintaining effective and independent regulatory agencies, which became subject to 
competing demands (Gerchunoff and Cánovas 1996; Post and Murillo 2013). Investors 
insisted on tariff increases to fund service expansion and upgrades while provincial 
officials, at the behest of civil society groups, ordered rate freezes and stiff penalties for 
firms that failed to meet service upgrade schedules. Many investors reduced operating 
costs with cuts to their labor force, creating a massive pool of unemployed persons that 
fed social opposition. The privatization process was therefore heavily politicized and seen 
as concentrating wealth in the hands of rent-seeking firms (Rodriguez-Boetsch 2005: 
306).  
 In this tense political environment Argentina faced its first investor claims, 
prompted by disputes between investors and provincial authorities. Privatized water 
companies, France-based Vivendi and US-based Azurix, brought claims after provincial 
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governments blocked rate increases and imposed fines. Consumer groups accused the 
companies of failing to meet community needs and providing contaminated water. 
Activists led street demonstrations and boycotted bill payments. Energy firms also 
brought claims in protest of the introduction of stamp taxes in some provinces. Additional 
claims were brought by Lanco International and Siemens after the cancellation of their 
contracts with the national government. Siemens, however, withdrew its claim after the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission published a report in which the company 
admitted to bribing officials to obtain its original contract (Torterola and Gosis 2012: 18). 
 Argentine officials were unprepared to address the claims. Few state lawyers had 
experience in international arbitration or an intimate knowledge of the BITs. The state 
was first represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international law firms with 
expertise in commercial arbitration. The Procuración del Tesoro de la Nación (Office of 
the Attorney General, PTN) then established an in-house team of internationally trained 
lawyers that assumed lead of the cases in 2000.ii Most claims were settled and, as such, 
did not meet the final stages. However, two awards rendered in favor of Azurix and 
Vivendi, including a US$ 165 million and US$ 105 million award respectively, served as 
early warning signs of the potential costs BITs posed.  
 Toward the end of the 1990s, a series of external shocks led to rapidly 
deteriorating economic conditions (cf. Rodriguez-Boetsch 2005). The country’s current-
account deficit leapt from US$ 6.8 billion in 1996 to US$ 14.5 billion in 1998. Output 
plummeted and GDP fell, peaking in 2002 at a ten percent contraction (Wylde 2011: 
437). The poverty rate more than doubled from 27.1 to 54.7 percent while those living in 
extreme poverty more than tripled (IMF 2005: 24).  In 1999, Fernando de la Rúa assumed 
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presidency and abided by the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) recommendations to 
raise taxes, further cut government spending and institute labor market flexibilization 
laws (Rodríguez-Boetsch 2005: 308). This contradicted his electoral promises to reverse 
neoliberal orthodoxy and demonstrated the influence the international financial 
community retained over government decision-making. Calls from labor and the middle 
class for progressive change grew stronger and new forms of social mobilization, 
including the piqueteros (picketers) movement consisting of unemployed persons and 
their families, channeled their dissatisfaction through street and highway blockades (Vila 
2006: 169).  
In December 2001, street demonstrations in city centers and widespread looting in 
Buenos Aires forced de la Rúa to resign. Argentina then cycled through three presidents 
until Congress appointed Eduardo Duhalde. Under Duhalde, officials recognized that a 
drastic solution was needed to quell unrest and tackle deficit problems. A currency 
devaluation was perceived as necessary to restore the competitiveness of Argentine 
exports (Rodriguez-Boetsch 2005: 308). In January 2002, Congress introduced 
emergency measures (Law 25.562) that froze deregulated utility rates and ended the 
Convertibility Plan. The peso devalued, temporarily stabilizing at a rate of three pesos to 
the US dollar. The measures also eliminated the right of utilities owners to calculate 
tariffs in dollars and converted tariffs to a fixed peso rate, which significantly reduced the 
value of contracts, licenses and concessions with dollar adjustment features. This was 
accompanied by the largest debt default in history (Post and Murillo 2013; Stanley 2006).  
Officials knew the emergency measures would negatively impact foreign 
investors and were aware of the rights BITs afforded them because the pre-crisis claims. 
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However, the terms of investors’ original contracts were perceived to be no longer viable 
due to the severe strain they placed on users’ budgets whose incomes had also devalued. 
The growing mobilization of the unemployed and poor combined with de la Rúa’s 
ousting demonstrated the growing political clout of marginalized sectors. Maintaining 
affordable access to basic services therefore outweighed investors’ property rights in 
government decision making.   
 Foreign investors were hit with severe financial losses since their debt remained 
nominated in dollars (Vicien-Milburn and Andreeva 2010: 295). Investors demanded 
tariffs increases and new user fees to stay afloat. Most provincial governments and the 
national government refused as it risked social unrest. The government offered investors 
two options: renegotiate tariffs or continue with the existing tariff system (Stanley 2006: 
7). In February 2002, the Commission for the Renegotiation of Concession Contracts 
(CRCC) was established to renegotiate contracts. Provincial governments undertook 
similar renegotiations with investors in their jurisdiction. Some investors rejected the 
process and filed an arbitral claim. Approximately 45 claims were brought against 
Argentina, all but four of which were convened under ICSID. Nine claims involved water 
and sanitation services and 20 involved electricity and gas distribution. Investors alleged 
that the impacts of the emergency measures constituted breaches of BIT provisions on 
fair and equitable treatment, full security and protection and expropriation. Most 
investors, however, filed claims primarily to enhance their bargaining position during 
contract renegotiations.iii Such claims galvanized public opposition, leading to calls from 
civil society groups and opposing legislators for a cancellation of BITs. 
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When Néstor Kirchner took office in 2003, the government adopted a strict stance 
toward foreign investors. Kirchner replaced the CCRC with the Public Service Contract 
and Renegotiation Unit whose objective was to incent investors to drop their claims with 
the promise of new contracts. Some investors suspended their claims to signal their 
willingness to negotiate.iv This included investors with interests in continuing their 
operations and who stood to gain more from settlement in the long run. Minority 
shareholders and owners of companies that already exited Argentina were more inclined 
to maintain their claims (Mortimore and Stanley 2006).   
 Kirchner’s election represented a degree of political renewal. Kirchner aimed to 
break Argentina’s historic susceptibility to macroeconomic instability while 
redistributing wealth and renewing state alliances with labor and business. Kirchner 
expanded a conditional cash transfer program instituted by Duhalde called Plan Jefes y 
Jefas de Hogar with the PlanesTrabajar and Plan Familias. He also instituted 
progressive labor policies and introduced industrial and macroeconomic policies to 
strengthen economic growth. This included public works programs, selective protective 
tariffs and subsidies, and additional credit for small and medium-sized businesses. 
Central to macroeconomic policy was the Stable and Competitive Real Exchange Rate, 
which facilitated a boom in exports and sustained fiscal surpluses. This helped swell 
government coffers in the presence of export taxes and record high international 
commodity prices (Wylde 2016: 332 – 334). Kirchner also strengthened relations with 
alternative economic partners, including China and Iran, to expand access to foreign 
capital. In 2004, President Hu of China committed to investing $20 billion in Argentina, 
most of which targeted the country’s energy and transportation industries (Paz 2014: 8). 
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Within a year of Kirchner’s election, the economy began to rebound. Kirchner 
diverted financial resources towards paying off international creditors, including the IMF, 
which he saw as imposing unreasonable constraints on the country’s policy autonomy 
(Grugel and Riggirozzi 2007: 99). Kirchner also undertook a debt restructuring process, 
securing an agreement with 70 to 75 percent of sovereign bondholders with a significant 
cut to the bonds’ value (Kuegal 2013). Kirchner’s refusal to settle with holdouts meant 
the country could no longer issue bond abroad, limiting the country’s access to 
international credit markets. However, the economy continued to perform well. Kirchner 
funded the expansion of provincial infrastructure projects and began renationalizing 
public services, reducing dependencies on foreign investment and filling gaps where 
investors exited the market (Post and Murillo 2013: 122). Major concessions in the water 
and sanitation sector were rescinded, including those with Suez, Enron, Saur and Vivendi 
who had cases pending before ICSID. By May 2006, the proportion of the population 
serviced by SOEs in the water sector grew from 12 percent to 57 percent (Azpiazu and 
Bonofiglio 2006: 36). Yet, as Christopher Wylde (2016: 334) notes,  
This all occurred under a broad acceptance of core neoliberal principles – the 
importance of conservative fiscal policy and budget surpluses, steady inflation, an 
awareness of inefficiencies associated with many forms of state intervention and 
state ownership, the acceptance of primacy of the market in setting prices, the 
abandonment of economic protectionism in favour of at least relative economic 
opening and regional integration, and – albeit cautious and selective – welcoming 
of foreign direct investment. 
 19 
Thus, ideologically, Kirchner did not reject neoliberal precepts but sought to balance 
them by renewing the state’s regulatory role and softening its impacts on the poor. 
 Argentina’s economic recovery made it easier to settle with foreign investors. 
Higher revenue from industrial sales cross-subsidized services for residential clients. In 
some cases, national and provincial governments allowed firms to raise rates charged to 
wealthy and industrial users in exchange for commitments to keep rates low for poorer 
sectors and withdrawing arbitral claims (Post and Murillo 2013: 124). Suez and Aguas de 
Barcelona, for instance, withdrew its US$ 105 million ICSID claim after agreeing with 
the province of Cordoba to a rate increase of 20 to 50 percent for medium-income 
neighborhoods and up to 100 percent for the wealthiest sectors while rates for poorer 
households were kept low (Brundell 2005; Olivera 2005). In total, 19 investor claims 
prompted by the crisis were settled, including 13 in the utilities sector.  
 Where contract renegotiations failed, Kirchner employed legal strategies to 
defend the emergency measures. Central to the PTN’s strategy was the state of necessity 
defense provided for under most BITs and customary international law. This defense 
exempts actions taken by states in response to extraordinary circumstances from the 
substantive protection of the treaties (Thjoernelund 2009). State lawyers argued that the 
measures were necessary to address the crisis and that investors must bear part of the 
adjustment burden as domestic investors had done. Such measures ensured impoverished 
citizens access to clean water according to the government’s human rights obligations. 
Arbitral tribunals responded inconsistently. According to Peterson (2012), arbitrators 
rejected Argentina’s necessity defense unanimously in five cases (CMS, Sempra, Enron, 
BG and National Grid), by a two to one majority in three cases (Suez, Impreglio and El 
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Paso) and accepted the defense to some extent in three cases (LG&E, Continental 
Casualty and Total). The necessity defense was therefore only marginally successful. 
Where cases reached a final ruling, foreign investors were more likely to win out; 19 
concluded cases were rendered in favor of investors and only four in favor of the state. 
 Argentina sought annulment on all awards rendered against it. There is no 
appellate body through which ICSID awards are reviewed. Rather, Article 53 of the 
ICSID convention makes possible the stay of an award’s enforcement to allow parties to 
request interpretations of IIA provisions, a revision to the award or annulment. Article 52, 
moreover, restricts the grounds on which parties can seek annulments to flaws in arbitral 
procedures (Lin 2012: 4). This means that awards can only be revised on narrow grounds. 
Over time, however, the PTN proved increasingly effective in annulment proceedings. 
Three of the five cases in which arbitrators unanimously rejected Argentina’s necessity 
defense were annulled, including a US$ 106 million award in favor of Enron (Peterson 
2012). Multiple investor claims therefore improved the government’s capacity in legal 
defense over time.  
 Where annulment failed, Kirchner refused to pay investors’ awards unless they 
were reviewed by Argentine courts. It was assumed when ICSID was established that 
states would voluntarily comply with rulings as the costs of non-compliance, in terms of 
the state’s international reputation and the threat of economic sanctions, were considered 
enough to incent good behavior (Lin 2012). However, government officials were deeply 
skeptical of ICSID and believed the institution to be biased towards corporate interests.v 
Officials criticized the lack of transparency and the process by which arbitrators are 
selected. Paying ICSID awards was perceived to validate unfair rulings. Argentina’s 
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Minister of Justice Horacio Rosatti, moreover, rejected the notion that ICSID decisions 
should be given primacy over Argentina’s constitution and claimed they needed to be 
reviewed by Argentine courts for compatibility at the investor’s expense (Goodman 
2007: 479).  Argentina withheld payment on five awards after investors refused to submit 
them to Argentine courts for review.  
 The election of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in 2007 brought continuity to 
Argentina’s development strategy and, to some extent, the country’s relations with 
foreign investors. Another round of debt restructuring in 2010 secured an agreement for 
the repayment of all but 7 percent of the remaining bonds at 30 percent of their value. 
The remaining holdouts, however, pursued legal action in New York courts, continuing 
Argentina’s isolation from international capital markets (Kuegal 2013). Kirchner’s 
refusal to settle with the holdouts continued her popular support. Her popularity 
combined with Argentina’s economic recovery provided a basis on which Kirchner could 
further challenge foreign investors. Indeed, despite mounting investor claims, Kirchner 
nationalized industries deemed to be of national importance. This included two airlines 
Aerolineas Argentina and Austral-Cielos del Sur S. A., effectively nationalized by 
Congress in 2008, and 51 percent of shares in Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) 
expropriated in 2012. The former prompted claims by Spanish companies Teinver, 
Transportes de Cercanías and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur and the latter by Repsol.  
Toward the end of 2010, the economy showed signs of decline, contracting 1 
percent in 2011 (IMF 2017). In 2012, the United States suspended Argentina’s 
preferential trade status and blocked its access to World Bank loans in response to the 
refusal to pay US investors (Fox and Rosenberg 2013: 56). Argentina’s declining 
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economic fortunes coincided with a more conciliatory approach towards some foreign 
investors. In 2013, Kirchner agreed to pay five outstanding arbitral awards. Payment, 
however, was in the form of government bonds at approximately 75 percent of their face 
value (Kiguel 2013). The deal reduced the final sum owed and enabled Kirchner to 
escape immediate payment. Kirchner’s decision to negotiate likely resulted from the need 
to improve relations with the international community and domestic business who feared 
the government was driving away needed foreign capital. Indeed, the maintenance of 
capital controls and introduction of new export taxes drew opposition from the middle 
class and business. Having recovered from the crisis, internationally-oriented business 
elites pressed for economic liberalization. Kirchner persisted in her refusal to settle with 
bond holdouts however her popularity steadily eroded, culminating in her loss to the 
centre-right Republican Proposal candidate Mauricio Macri in the 2015 elections.   
It is important to note that despite their combative rhetoric, the Kirchners did not 
terminate BITs or withdraw from ICSID. Many officials believed BITs help attract 
foreign capital and the potential costs of terminating them.vi Instead, they placed a hold 
on signing BITs to re-evaluate future terms. Argentina also joined efforts to establish an 
alternative arbitration center under the auspices of the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas 
(UNASUR). The UNASUR arbitration center is intended to establish rules that enhance 
the transparency of ISDS proceedings, grant greater recognition to state interests, and 
construct an appellate mechanism for the review of awards.vii However, whether the 
center will reach its final stages is questionable. Under Macri’s leadership, Argentina is 
deepening its commitments to foreign investors despite its long history of protracted legal 
battles. Macri promised to renew the state’s relationship with the international financial 
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community and has taken measures to liberalize the domestic investment market, for 
example, by eliminating capital controls and reducing export tariffs. Macri also signed 
new BITs with Qatar and Japan that contain traditional ISDS provisions and grant prior 
consent to ICSID with few modifications aimed at curtailing investor rights.  
Overall, 19 claims of the crisis claims were settled, most with new pro-poor 
contracts. Annulment proceedings used to overturn prior rulings with revisions to the 
state’s necessity defense helped reduce the amount owed to investors before taxes and 
legal fees by $420 million.viii While the Kirchners’ refusal to pay arbitral awards was 
believed by many to be an affront to the enforcement system, officials rejected the notion 
that they broke any laws. Asserting domestic jurisdiction over ICSID awards was 
perceived to be a means of balancing out the corporate bias in the arbitration system. 
However, this did come at significant costs in terms of the country’s relations with 
traditional partners and access to foreign capital. The Kirchners’ hesitancy to terminate 
BITs demonstrates limitations in how far they were willing to go to shield domestic 
interests from the potential costs of BITs. As demonstrated in the next case, countries that 
have faced fewer investor claims terminated existing agreements.   
 
Ecuador and Big Oil: Mobilizing Opposition for Withdrawal 
23 known investor claims have been brought against Ecuador, the most 
politicized and costly of which involve foreign oil companies. Most disputes with oil 
companies stemmed from successive attempts to extend government control over the oil 
sector after a massive privatization process in the 1990s. As this section demonstrates, 
these policies were prompted by civil society demands for greater benefits from oil 
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production and the need to refill government coffers drained by an economic collapse. 
Once Rafael Correa came to power and the economy regained strength, the government 
leveraged social opposition to foreign oil companies to terminate BITs.  
Since 1971, oil exploration and exploitation remained under government 
control via Petroecuador. In the 1990s, Ecuador liberalized its hydrocarbons sector by 
modifying the oil contract system to increase incentives for foreign investment. Under the 
previous service contract model, Petroecuador assumed the costs of oil exploration and 
production and contracted out limited duties to private companies. This scheme offered 
minimal profits to private companies and attracted limited foreign investment. New 
production-sharing contracts, however, gave some of the risk of oil exploration and 
extraction to companies in exchange for a share in the oil produced. Foreign investment 
in the oil sector increased rapidly from US$ 90 million in 1991 to $ 1,120 million in 
2001. Known reserves also increased markedly, from 2,115 billion barrels in the mid 
1990s to 4,630 billion by 2004 (Stanley 2008: 5 – 7).  
The new contracts were deemed a success, however, the sale of natural 
resources to foreign companies was heavily politicized. Profits from oil production 
flowed out of the country as poverty rates persisted. At the same time, indigenous 
organizing surged, driven by a renewed sense of political identity and opposition to 
neoliberal reforms. Indigenous groups were joined by environmental activists as the most 
vocal critics of neoliberal policy, which included oil sector privatization. Activists 
mobilized against instances of land appropriation, the detrimental health impacts, and the 
marginalization of indigenous livelihoods resulting from the entry and expansion of 
foreign oil companies (Perreault and Valdivia 2009). It is important to note, however, that 
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most activists demanded greater benefits and stronger oversight to minimize 
environmental damage and were not opposed to oil extraction in principle.  
A grave economic crisis in the late 1990s led to political instability and 
exacerbated social unrest. By 1999, Ecuador faced severe monetary instability with 
hyperinflation, capital flight and a mounting debt burden. The government under 
President Jamil Mahuad, a formally educated social democrat, ‘dollarized’ the economy 
to restore investor confidence and avoid hyperinflation. Mahuad hoped the move would 
also restore his political appeal, however, he was deposed in January 2000 after an 
indigenous uprising took over parliamentary buildings with the help of military factions. 
His Vice President, Gustavo Naboa, was sworn in (Beckerman and Solimano 2001: 2-3). 
Under Naboa, the government renegotiated its debt burden and adopted measures to 
improve tax collection. The country’s fiscal accounts drastically improved, even 
achieving a small surplus in 2000 (Ibid: 3). 
It was in this context that the government began re-evaluating concessions 
given to foreign oil companies. In August 2001, Ecuador’s tax authority announced that 
oil companies would no longer receive reimbursements on value added tax (VAT). Oil 
companies received VAT reimbursements paid for goods and services used in the 
production of oil for export. However, the economic crisis created new demands for 
regulatory changes that would replenish government coffers. The government claimed 
that VAT credits had been granted in error and withheld almost US$ 200 million in 
anticipated reimbursements. Companies were also ordered to repay credits previously 
granted. A handful of companies refused, including US-based Occidental and Canadian 
company EnCana who brought BIT claims in response. The companies accused Ecuador 
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of violating BIT provisions on expropriation, national treatment, fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security.  
The VAT disputes were among the first BIT claims brought against Ecuador. 
Like Argentina, Ecuadorian officials were largely inexperienced in international 
arbitration and unfamiliar with the terms of the BITs.ix A team was quickly established 
under the Procuraduria General del Estado (PGE, Attorney General) to oversee the state’s 
legal defense, however, it worked closely with international law firms based in the United 
States and United Kingdom that developed the legal strategy.x In this way, the 
government avoided the steep learning curve experienced by Argentina’s legal team. The 
PGE was instructed to pursue all avenues available to have the claims dismissed, 
annulled or withdrawn.xi State attorneys argued that the VAT disputes pertained to the 
state’s right to tax and were more appropriately resolved in domestic courts. Most BITs 
contain provisions that exempt matters of taxation from treaty coverage, subject to 
specified exceptions. Arbitrators, however, responded inconsistently.  
The arbitral tribunal overseeing Occidental’s claim found Ecuador liable for 
failing to provide a transparent and predictable framework for planning and for 
discriminatory treatment because the government continued to provide VAT credits to 
other export sectors.xii The tribunal overseeing Encana’s claim, however, held that ‘in the 
absence of a specific commitment from the host-state, the foreign investor has neither the 
right nor any legitimate expectation that the tax regime will not change.’xiii They also 
found Ecuador’s refusal to issue VAT refunds did not amount to expropriation given that 
Encana was free to pursue damages in domestic courts and continued to profit from its 
operations. While Encana’s claim was dismissed, Occidental was awarded US$ 75 
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million in a heavily publicized ruling that prompted public backlash.  
In response, the Attorney General audited Occidental’s activities. The audit 
revealed that Occidental had breached its concession contract and the national 
Hydrocarbons Law by selling off 40 percent of its stake without proper ministerial 
authorization. He then called for the termination of Occidental’s contract. Indigenous and 
environmental groups, joined by middle class activists and then-presidential candidate 
Rafael Correa, occupied the streets of Quito in demand of Occidental’s ousting. During a 
major strike in June, the Minister of Energy and Mines signed a resolution committing to 
‘undertaking all of the necessary steps for the departure from Ecuador of the companies 
Occidental…for having violated the juridical norms of the country.’xiv Activists and 
nationalist legislators then threatened to impeach then-President Alfred Palacio after the 
Minister announced he was considering a settlement. Only then was the contract formally 
terminated and Occidental’s assets expropriated, a direct response to the demands of civil 
society. Occidental responded with a second arbitral claim referencing the social 
mobilization as evidence of the government’s politically-motivated, and hence 
discriminatory treatment.  
As the Occidental dispute unraveled, a boom in oil prices led to soaring 
production and a sharp increase in crude exports. By 2005, oil prices had more than 
tripled and continued to rise. Civil society demands for greater benefits from oil 
extraction grew in urgency. Despite their awareness of the protection BITs afforded them, 
the Palacio government initiated an audit of oil contracts, which concluded that private 
oil companies earned extraordinary profits. Palacio then announced that oil contracts 
would have to be renegotiated.xv The following year, Congress amended the 
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Hydrocarbons Law (No. 2006-42) and placed a 50 percent tax on oil exports when prices 
exceeded a benchmark level. The new law referenced the government’s responsibility to 
‘defend the natural heritage of the country and preserve the sustainable growth of the 
economy, as well as balanced, equitable development for the collective good.’xvi While 
the move was well received by citizens, oil companies and the Chamber of Manufacturers 
of Pinchincha challenged the law in Ecuador’s Constitutional Court. The Court however 
confirmed the constitutionality of the amendments.  
 In October 2007, the administration of newly elected President Rafael Correa 
increased the tax to 99 percent. Correa declared in a public radio address that oil 
companies had three options: comply with the windfall tax, agree to transfer the existing 
contract into a service contract, or divest their assets. Correa’s primary goal was to 
convert existing contracts into service contracts to regain government control over oil 
exploitation and revenue.xvii US-based companies Murphy and Burlington and French 
company Perenco refused to comply and instead brought treaty claims. This, however, 
did not prevent Correa from seizing Perenco and Burlington’s oil, which was auctioned to 
pay the company’s debt that accrued due to the windfall tax. A tribunal under ICSID, 
where the Perenco’s claim was taken, ordered Ecuador to refrain from taking such action 
until the cases were resolved. The government, however, responded by asserting ‘Law 42 
and its implementing Decrees…were enacted at the highest levels of government... Under 
the circumstances, Law 42 must be applied and enforced, lest the integrity of the legal 
order be undermined.’xviii Burlington and Perenco then suspended operations to which 
Ecuador again retaliated by terminating their contracts and seizing control of the area.  
Correa was elected in November 2006 with the support of a broad-based political 
 29 
movement, Alianza Patria Altiva y Soberana (Proud and Sovereign Fatherland), winning 
56.7 percent of the vote in the second round (Conaghan 2008: 47). A US-trained 
economist, Correa served under Palacio as the Minister of the Economy and gained 
popularity for his opposition to neoliberalism and calls for renewing state sovereignty. He 
denounced the existing party structure as exclusive and corrupt and as feeding the 
interests of the business establishment. His political campaign to institute a ‘Citizen’s 
Revolution’ and ‘21st Century Socialism’ involved reforming state institutions and 
enacting greater cultural rights for the indigenous. This earned him populist appeal and a 
majority government, a rarity in a country where leaders were often impeached (Ibid).  
A long-running dispute between US oil giant Chevron and residents of Lago 
Agrio in the Amazon came to a head amid Correa’s rise to power. In 2006, Chevron 
introduced a claim under UNCITRAL arbitral rules alleging that Ecuador violated BIT 
provisions on fair and equitable treatment in failing to deal fairly and timely with 
multiple breach-of-contract lawsuits levied against it by its subsidiary, Texaco Petroleum 
in the 1990s. The timing of Chevron’s claim was widely criticized as an attempt to 
pressure the government to intervene in a class action lawsuit brought against it in US 
courts by Lago Agrio residents. In the class action suit, residents alleged that Texaco 
dumped 18 billion tons of waste in the rainforest, resulting in severe environmental 
damage, cancers, birth defects and miscarriages in surrounding communities. Chevron 
challenged the claims on the grounds that the case should be heard in Ecuador. The judge 
agreed and proceedings were taken up in Ecuador in 2003. The Palacio government had 
refused to intervene in the proceedings. The Correa government threw its support behind 
Lago Agrio residents (Diaz 2009).  
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In September 2009, Chevron filed another arbitral claim accusing the government 
of unfairly favoring its citizens in violation of the BIT provision on fair and equitable 
treatment. Chevron requested relief from the almost $US9.5 billion awarded to Lago 
Agrio in the class action suit. In January 2011, the tribunal ordered Ecuador to ‘take all 
measures necessary to suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement or recognition 
within and without Ecuador of any judgment against [Chevron] in the Lago Agrio 
case.’xix The government refused and an Ecuadorian court confirmed that the ICSID 
tribunal had no power to compel the government to violate its obligations to Lago Agrio 
residents (Johnson 2012).  
Correa’s refusal to abide by tribunal orders reflected his desire to reassert state 
sovereignty surrendered to international institutions. Policymakers were particularly 
skeptical of ICSID because of its affiliation with the World Bank and the historic 
influence of the United States over that institution.xx In December 2007, Correa notified 
ICSID that Ecuador did not consent to arbitration for disputes concerning natural 
resources (Cadena and Montañes 2007: 154). ICSID arbitrators ruled the notice had no 
force and effect.xxi Ecuador then announced that contracts with oil companies would be 
considered void unless ICSID was removed as a venue for arbitration over contractual 
matters. Chile’s Centre for Arbitration and Mediation (CCAM) has since been included 
in new oil contracts as an alternative (Diaz 2008: 6). The CCAM was chosen because 
officials believed such proceedings would be conducted more fairly in a Latin American 
institution that was less susceptible to Western influence. In 2008, Correa also denounced 
BITs with El Salvador, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Romania with widespread support in the National Assembly. 
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Ecuadorian business groups protested the decision, arguing that it would scare away 
needed investment. However, officials argued that the agreements failed to bring 
significant economic benefits and exposed the country to undue risk.xxii  
Correa conducted an extensive outreach campaign, chastising oil companies, their 
legal representatives and international arbitrators through radio addresses and televised 
appearances.xxiiiA new Constitution adopted in 2008 provided the legal basis for 
Ecuador’s withdrawal from international arbitration. Article 422 of the Constitution 
prevents the government from ceding sovereign jurisdiction to international arbitration 
entities outside of Latin America. This provision is, in part, a manifestation of the 
widespread dissatisfaction with arbitral rulings and highly publicized battles with oil 
companies. Correa denounced the ICSID convention as a violation of Article 422, again 
with widespread congressional support, and requested approval from the National 
Assembly to terminate additional BITs that granted ICSID jurisdiction. The National 
Assembly returned this request on the grounds that it required a prior ruling from the 
Constitutional Court (Gómez 2012: 462-463). The Constitutional Court confirmed that 
most BITs violated Article 422 and granted authority to denounce them. Correa, 
however, terminated only two BITs (with Germany and Romania) while maintaining 
others, including that with the United States under which most investor claims have been 
brought. Some policymakers argued that the agreement provided economic benefits 
despite the risks of investment disputes.   
Successive losses in ISDS proceedings fed public debate. In March 2010, 
Chevron was awarded US$ 96 million over the breach-of-contract cases. In October 
2012, Occidental’s was awarded US$1.77 billion for its second claim, although this was 
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later reduced to US$1.016 billion following an annulment ruling.  Arbitrators in the 
Occidental case found that although Ecuador acted in accordance with its legal rights in 
terminating Occidental’s contract, failing to compensate the firm was a disproportionate 
response. The ruling was remarkable in terms of the amount awarded and the tribunal’s 
willingness to exert judgment over what constituted an appropriate government response 
to a breach of domestic law. The awards ignited calls for a further termination of BITs. 
Correa, however placed the termination on hold pending recommendations from a 
Citizen’s Audit Commission. Correa’s hesitancy to terminate its BIT with the United 
States reflected tensions in his development strategy. Extractivism was central to 
Correa’s modernization project as revenue derived from oil profits funded the expansion 
of social and development programs. The government is also heavily dependent on 
foreign capital and technologies to exploit its oil resources and welcomed foreign 
companies despite opposition from indigenous and environmental groups. These 
dependencies contributed to the government’s reluctance to terminate BITs with large 
economic partners.  
Correa established the Citizen’s Audit Commission in October 2012 to assess the 
constitutionality of remaining BITs and their impacts. In line with Correa’s commitment 
to enhance political inclusivity, the Commission brought together foreign experts, 
government officials and civil society representatives. Its members, however, were 
appointed and are known for being highly critical of BITs and ICSID. In their 2017 
report, the Commission advised the cancelation of remaining BITs and the negotiation of 
new agreements that provide for state-state dispute resolution, investor obligations, and 
narrow the scope of key provisions (CAITISA 2017). Shortly before the 2016 elections, 
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Correa announced the termination of Ecuador’s remaining BITs. Legislators believed that 
as it stood, ‘there is no room for advancing progressive social and political objectives 
under the current investment legal regime’.xxiv 
Like the Kirchners, Correa strengthened commercial ties with nontraditional 
partners including China, Russia and Iran, countries perceived to be less likely to 
interfere in the articulation of Ecuador’s sovereignty (Conaghan 2008: 56). Ecuador is 
one of the largest recipients of Chinese investment in Latin America and Chinese firms 
have become some of the largest players in its oil and gas industry (ECLAC 2013: 11). 
This reduced the country’s dependence on US investment. Correa also led regional 
initiatives aimed at reforming ISDS and enhancing inter-state cooperation on investment-
related matters. Correa first proposed the establishment of UNASUR’s arbitration center 
and established an alliance with Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and several 
Caribbean countries to encourage information sharing on investor-state disputes (Third 
World Network 2013). The government also developed a new model BIT entitled 
Investment for Development Agreement, which excludes ISDS and recognizes the 
supremacy of human rights and environmental and labor standards. This model will 
inform future negotiations on investment treaties and many of its standards are reflected 
in a free trade agreement Ecuador recently signed with the European Union, Peru and 
Colombia.xxv The Correa government was therefore not opposed to investment protection 
in principle but rejects the supremacy of international law and the notion that investor 
property rights should usurp its development goals.  
Ecuador won one of eight cases involving foreign oil companies and was found 
liable for damages in five cases. Awards rendered to oil companies currently amount to 
 34 
over 1.610 billion, not including interest, legal representation and the administrative fees 
of arbitral institutions.xxvi Despite Correa’s combative rhetoric, the government agreed to 
pay awards after they were confirmed by annulment tribunals. Correa successfully 
convinced most oil companies to adopt service contracts and forfeit their right to ICSID 
arbitration over contractual matters. This combined with the windfall tax helped capture 
greater oil profits. Government revenue derived from the oil sector increased from US$ 
2.211 billion in 2005 to US$8.675 billion in 2008, reaching a high of $12.935 billion in 
2012 (Ministry of Finance 2013). The added revenue outweighed the costs of investor 
claims and funded the expansion of social and development programs.  
 
Shaping the Legitimacy of BITs 
Argentina and Ecuador’s experience under BITs demonstrates that government 
orientations are informed by multiple, interacting factors that fluctuate over time. 
Competition for foreign investment and the desire to demonstrate credibility to the 
international community motivated governments in the 1990s to rush to BITs. This 
confirms what previous scholars have argued about the role these mechanisms play in 
BIT formulation (see Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2011; Allee and Peinhardt 2010; Elkins, 
Guzman and Simmons 2006). However, it should be noted that the BITs were signed 
amid the adoption of neoliberal policy prescriptions (liberalization, privatization and 
deregulation). State officials had therefore subscribed to neoliberal economic philosophy 
and were likely to see BITs as an appropriate policy instrument. This normative basis 
provided a conducive environment for the proliferation of BITs. 
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Over time, concerns of economic competition and credible commitment signalling 
were outweighed by domestic considerations. Governments in Ecuador and Argentina 
introduced policies they knew were likely to infringe on BIT obligations, but did so 
because they perceived such policies were necessary to meet public and political 
interests. Economic crises had drastically eroded the strength and political influence of 
internationally-oriented business elites and elevated the voices of the poor and 
marginalized. Widespread social mobilization, which resulted in the downfall of previous 
governments, demonstrated that officials could not favour foreign capital to the neglect of 
citizen demands and expect to retain their positions. Thus, civil society demands and the 
need to protect impoverished communities’ access to basic services outweighed BIT 
obligations in the decision-making of the Duhalde government, leading to the 
introduction of the emergency measures. Similarly, in Ecuador civil society demands 
drove the Palacio government to adopt policies aimed at capturing a greater oil profits 
despite the treaty rights of foreign-owned oil companies. This suggests that governments 
will take on these costs if they believe it necessary to advancing public and political 
interests.  
Once they came to power, the left-leaning administrations of the Kirchners and 
Correa adopted a strict stance toward investors and adopted strategies aimed at mitigating 
their costs. Yet, their different approaches are notable. Despite having faced more claims 
than Correa, the Kirchners refused to terminate BITs and withdraw Argentina’s 
membership from ICSID. Instead, the Kirchners aimed to incent foreign investors to drop 
their claims with new pro-poor contracts and exploited holes in enforcement mechanisms 
to delay payment of awards rendered. Conceding to foreign investors the ability to raise 
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tariffs for industrial and wealthy sectors in exchange for commitments on lower rates for 
the poor allowed investors to maintain the viability of their investments while preserving 
a key policy goal. Maintaining BITs, however, means that Argentina did not reduce its 
exposure to future investor claims and, under Macri, Argentina is now deepening its 
commitments to investor rights.  
The different approaches adopted by governments reflects variation in dominant 
political ideologies and state-society relations. The Kirchners rose to power with the 
support of workers and the poor and gained popularity because of their commitments to 
poverty alleviation and sound economic management. Yet, ideologically they did not 
represent a strong break from neoliberal norms; rather, they sought to soften the impacts 
of neoliberal policy on the poor. While state officials challenged the authority of ICSID 
because of suspected corporate bias, they believed costs of investor claims stemmed 
largely from the crisis conditions as opposed to the BITs themselves. Relatively few 
officials objected to BITs in principle. However, the Kirchners’ progressive social agenda 
meant that the government was susceptible to citizen demands. For the most part, these 
demands were prioritized over the demands of foreign investors. Therefore, the 
Kirchner’s selective adherence to, and limited contestation of, investment rules should be 
understood as an attempt to balance investor rights with citizen demands, particularly of 
the poor and marginalized.  
Correa rose to power on his commitments to strengthen cultural rights and 
redesign state institutions to enhance political and economic inclusivity. His ideology, 
although also left-leaning, incorporated stronger reformist elements than that of the 
Kirchners. Officials objected to ICSID and BITs in principle, perceiving them to be 
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extensions of corporate and Western interests. Successive investor claims and protest 
from internationally oriented business elites therefore failed to dissuade Correa from 
taking action against foreign investors and implementing regulatory changes that 
extended state control over oil profits. Redistributing wealth captured by oil companies 
therefore outweighed the importance assigned to investor demands. Terminating BITs, in 
turn, was perceived to be a necessary means of opening space for the further articulation 
of Correa’s development strategy. The legitimacy of BITs was therefore internalized to a 
lesser extent than in Kirchners’ administrations. However, recent attempts to negotiate 
more development-friendly investment treaties in Ecuador suggests that officials do not 
entirely reject limited investor rights so long as government regulatory space is protected.  
It is important to note that in both cases, governments’ bargaining position vis-à-
vis foreign investors was greatly strengthened by strong domestic economic performance 
and the popularity of their leaders. Post-crisis economic recovery reduced their 
economies’ dependence on foreign investment and gave confidence to state negotiators. 
Social opposition to foreign investors also meant that officials could take a hard-lined 
approach without fear of political reprisal. Yet it also reduced the concessions officials 
could offer to foreign investors to arrive at a settlement. This supports the importance that 
Simmons (2014) assigns to economic performance in shaping government orientations. It 
also should be noted that the availability of alternative economic partners enhanced 
governments’ abilities to lessen the impacts of economic sanctions introduced by investor 
home-states. Ideological beliefs therefore were not the only determining factor, but rather 
shaped the extent to which policymakers were willing to challenge existing rules relative 
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to other factors, like interest group pressure, domestic economic performance and 
economic competition. 
Governments are not passive recipients of international rules. Rather, they will 
introduce policies that infringe on international rules to advance public and political 
interests. BITs increase the costs of introducing policies against the interests of foreign 
investors, but governments adopt strategies to mitigate these costs with some success. 
This suggests that the constraints international rules place on government action will vary 
across time and place according to domestic conditions. Civil society activism may 
prompt governments to infringe on international agreements, particularly where domestic 
economic performance insulates officials from the pressures of global economic 
competition and economic sanctions. However, these cases suggest that reform-oriented 
governments are necessary to transfer social activism into material and substantive shifts 
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